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KSR V. TELEFLEX:
PREDICTABLE REFORM OF PATENT SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE IN THE JUDICIARY
John F. Duffy * †
Introduction
Though KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. is now widely acknowledged in the bar and the academy to be the most significant patent case in at
least a quarter century, that view dramatically underestimates the importance of the decision. The KSR decision has immense significance not
merely because it rejected the standard of patentability that had been applied
in the lower courts for decades, but also because it highlights many separate
trends that are reshaping the patent system.
This Commentary will touch upon four such trends that are clearly evident in KSR. First, the case was a predictable continuation of the Supreme
Court’s reengagement in the field of patent law. Second, the decision represents a continued revision to the substantive standards applied in patent law.
Third, and perhaps most overlooked, KSR heralds a significant procedural
reform to patent litigation. Fourth, the decision presents a classic example of
the judiciary revising judge-made doctrines in response to external criticism.
This final point raises the interesting theoretical issue of whether the traditional common law process in the patent field has been fatally hobbled by
the creation of a single intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over
most patent cases. KSR holds out the hope that the judiciary is still capable
of overseeing the field in the traditional manner, but developments in the
Congress and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) suggest that
this tradition may be coming to an end.
I. Predictable Reform
It is exceedingly rare that a Supreme Court decision can be responsible
for such a dramatic change in lower court law and yet have been so thoroughly predictable. I am confident in saying the decision was predictable
because my 2003 Supreme Court Review article, The Festo Decision and the
Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, not only predicted a general return of the Supreme Court to the patent field but also specifically
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singled out the obviousness doctrine as an area that the Court would address
“soon.” There is a story here, and it is worth telling because it shows how
patent issues can continue to attract the Supreme Court’s attention despite
the dominance of a single court of appeals over patent law.
Long before KSR, a notorious divergence between the obviousness
precedents of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit had been widely
recognized by patent attorneys and scholars. The divergence was easy to
see. While the regional circuits had cited the Supreme Court’s most recent
decision on obviousness, Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., about ten times per year
prior to the centralization of patent appeals in 1982, the Federal Circuit cited
Sakraida only four times in the twenty-four years between 1982 and the
grant of certiorari in KSR. What’s more, in three of the four cases, the court
had cited Sakraida only to disparage it.
In 2002, three significant events occurred, essentially guaranteeing that
the Supreme Court would soon review the Federal Circuit’s obviousness
case law. First, the Federal Circuit itself acknowledged in Engineering
Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc. that its obviousness precedents were significantly different from regional circuit precedent applied prior to the creation
of the Federal Circuit. That overt acknowledgment of a “circuit split” made
it much easier for a party to petition successfully for certiorari. Second, in a
case named In re Lee, the Federal Circuit reversed the PTO’s refusal of a
patent application and expressly indicated that the PTO should not rely on
“common sense” in rejecting patent applications. That decision created a
great deal of hostility at the PTO and also made the Federal Circuit doctrine
seem unreasonable on its face. Third, the Federal Trade Commission held
hearings that culminated in a report lucidly explaining the importance of the
obviousness standard and documenting the PTO’s increasing hostility to
Federal Circuit doctrine.
At the Federal Trade Commission hearings, I realized that the Supreme
Court would grant certiorari on the obviousness doctrine if only it were
asked to do so. Indeed, it seemed incredible that the government had not
sought certiorari after its then recent defeat in the Lee case. One PTO official explained to me that seeking Supreme Court review was an onerous
process inside the executive branch bureaucracy; I realized that private parties would be far more effective than the government in bringing the issue to
the Court. In subsequent speeches, I urged private attorneys to present the
issue to the Supreme Court. As a result of those speeches, I had the good
fortune to be asked to coauthor the successful certiorari petition.
The KSR experience shows that attracting the Supreme Court’s attention
to a patent law issue remains broadly similar, if not identical, to the process
in other areas of federal statutory law. In deciding whether to grant certiorari, the Court looks for conflicting authorities. In patent law, conflicts
between recent appellate decisions are nearly impossible due to the Federal
Circuit’s almost exclusive jurisdiction over the area, and so the Supreme
Court has learned to look elsewhere for signs of discord. In KSR, evidence
of conflict came from a comparison of Federal Circuit decisions with earlier
“pre-Federal Circuit” appellate decisions, from the opinions of scholars
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(who had long noted the tension between Supreme Court precedent and
Federal Circuit precedent), and from the government’s criticism of Federal
Circuit doctrine in the Federal Trade Commission report. Yet even with this
evidence, the Court was cautious; it asked the Solicitor General for his opinion prior to the grant of certiorari—a technique that the Court has deployed
frequently in the patent area. The resulting amicus brief from the Solicitor
General confirmed the conflicting views and sealed the case for certiorari.
II. Reform of Patent Substance
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has actively reviewed and
changed the substantive standards of patent law developed by the Federal
Circuit. KSR continued this trend, and, in fact, the most widely celebrated
aspect of KSR is its substantive effect on the patentability standard.
For almost all of its quarter century of existence, the Federal Circuit articulated and applied a patentability standard under which subject matter
claimed by a patent applicant would be considered nonobvious, and therefore patentable, unless it could be proven that a “teaching, suggestion, or
motivation” previously existed to make the claimed subject matter. The test
had become boilerplate in the Federal Circuit’s opinions and was applied by
that court in KSR. In the very beginning of its legal analysis, the Supreme
Court announced that it was “rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of
Appeals.” That simple, clear statement heralded a revolution in the field by
disavowing years of lower court precedent.
Yet for all its significance, the Supreme Court’s substantive holding was
also precisely targeted and limited. True, the Supreme Court disavowed the
rigid substantive standard that the Federal Circuit had applied for years, but
the Court left open many possible ways in which the substantive standard
could evolve. Though the Supreme Court has given the lower court a strong
reminder that it should cite and follow all the higher Court’s precedents on
the patentability standard, the Federal Circuit will still have substantial freedom, in the first instance, to choose which path the law should take in future
cases. That is as it should be, for KSR was the first obviousness case adjudicated by the Supreme Court in more than 30 years. But the limitations on
the Court’s holding blunt the substantive effect of KSR somewhat; the decision offers the Federal Circuit a new starting point rather than a final
destination.
III. Reform of Patent Procedure
As important as KSR is substantively, the decision’s procedural significance is even greater. Prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit had held that its
teaching-suggestion-motivation test presented an issue of fact for juries to
determine. The teaching-suggestion-motivation test therefore had the practical effect of transforming the issue of patent validity—which the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held to be an issue of law—into an issue of fact. Consequently, the basic validity of a patent, even one mistakenly issued without
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consideration of the relevant prior art, could not be decided without a multimillion dollar jury trial.
In KSR, the Supreme Court restated once again that validity is an issue
of law for judges to decide. The Court made this clear throughout the opinion by detailing questions that “the court must ask” in deciding obviousness
issues and by directing that “[t]o facilitate review, this analysis should be
made explicit.” Those directions clearly foreclose much jury involvement.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s disposition of KSR itself underscores that
the issue of “obviousness is a legal determination,” as the Court held it “appropriate” to invalidate the patent claim at issue on summary judgment.
Thus, after KSR there will undoubtedly be a sea change in procedure, as
deciding obviousness—and likely other validity issues—becomes the exclusive province of the judge.
Indeed, another Court decision just a few months before KSR greatly
magnified the latter decision’s procedural implications. In January 2007, the
Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. overturned the Federal Circuit’s restrictive case law on the availability of declaratory
judgments in patent cases. In combination, KSR and MedImmune allow a
party threatened with a potentially invalid patent to file a declaratory judgment action as soon as the threat becomes known and to seek immediate
summary judgment as to the patent’s validity. Such an action holds the
promise of a relatively inexpensive and quick judicial decision on the basic
validity of the patent. Defendants have long sought such an efficient method
for challenging questionable patents; previously their best hope had been for
new legislation that would create an administrative process for reconsidering
the validity of issued patents. Now defendants may find their Holy Grail in
the courts.
IV. Judiciary Reform and the Coming Death of the
Common Law in the Patent System
Although patent law is a creature of federal statute, it has long been
dominated by judicially-created common law. As in antitrust (that “other”
branch of federal monopoly law), the key statutory provisions fairly exude
ambiguity. The hallmark of the common law process is the incremental development of legal doctrine, as the courts themselves constantly experiment
with changes and correct themselves when the changes go awry or go too
far.
KSR carries on that tradition of growth and correction, but it remains unclear whether the tradition will continue much longer. Congress has become
increasingly willing to consider detailed patent legislation, which could displace the traditional common law process through its sheer length, if
perhaps not its clarity. Similarly, the PTO is becoming more aggressive in
issuing guidelines and promulgating procedural rules as a means of controlling the development of the law. Such administrative actions could also
displace judicially-developed common law. Furthermore, the primary pieces
of patent reform legislation introduced this year in the House and the Senate
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proposed delegating broad rule-making powers that would allow the PTO to
supplant the courts as the primary organ for developing law and policy in
the patent system.
Thus, KSR may be one of the last great common law decisions on patent
law. If that happens, the death of patent common law will be directly attributable to the creation of a single court of appeals in the field. Even with the
Supreme Court’s increased oversight, the Federal Circuit is likely to remain
the sole appellate court issuing binding precedents on many important issues
in the field. Ironically, that concentration of judicial power on patent issues
seems to be bringing about the demise of the traditional judicial power to
shape patent common law. Supreme Court review—even for an issue sufficiently important to prompt certiorari—may not be forthcoming for many
years or even, as KSR shows, decades. The continual process of intercourt
debate and incremental conflict so essential to the health of the common law
has thereby been sacrificed on the altar of uniformity. In the absence of
structural reform that would spread patent jurisdiction to a few additional
circuits, as Craig A. Nard and I propose in our forthcoming Northwestern
Law Review article, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, the centuries-old arc of judicial development of patent law, of which KSR is merely
the most recent part, may not survive long into this new century.

